

Asset Price Bubbles and Systemic Risk*

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Abstract

This paper empirically analyzes the effects of asset price bubbles on systemic risk. Based on a broad sample of banks from 17 OECD countries between 1987 and 2015, we show that asset price bubbles in stock and real estate markets raise systemic risk at the bank level. The strength of the effect depends strongly on bank characteristics (bank size, loan growth, leverage, and maturity mismatch) as well as bubble characteristics (length and size). These findings suggest that the adverse effects of bubbles can be mitigated substantially by strengthening the resilience of financial institutions.

Keywords: Asset price bubbles, systemic risk, financial crises, credit booms, CoVaR.

JEL-Classification: E32, G01, G12, G20, G32.

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Abstract

This paper empirically analyzes the effects of asset price bubbles on systemic risk. Based on a broad sample of banks from 17 OECD countries between 1987 and 2015, we show that asset price bubbles in stock and real estate markets raise systemic risk at the bank level. The strength of the effect depends strongly on bank characteristics (bank size, loan growth, leverage, and maturity mismatch) as well as bubble characteristics (length and size). These findings suggest that the adverse effects of bubbles can be mitigated substantially by strengthening the resilience of financial institutions.

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1 Introduction

Financial crises are often accompanied by a boom and bust cycle in asset prices (Borio and Lowe, 2002; Kindleberger and Aliber, 2005). Bursting asset price bubbles can have detrimental effects on the financial system and give rise to systemic financial crises. Yet, not all bubbles are equally harmful. Some, like the one preceding the Great Financial Crisis, contribute to the collapse of the entire financial system, while others, like the dotcom bubble, cause high financial losses but do not have any wider macroeconomic consequences.

Historical evidence suggests that the severity of crises after the burst of a bubble depends on the involvement of the financial system. For example, bubbles accompanied by strong lending booms tend to be followed by more severe crises (Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor, 2015b; Brunnermeier and Schnabel, 2016). Moreover, disturbances in small market segments may be amplified through the financial sector. The US subprime mortgage market accounted for only 4 percent of the US mortgage market at the time of the burst of the bubble (Brunnermeier and Oehmke, 2013, p. 1223). Yet, the burst of subprime housing bubble gave rise to one of the biggest financial crises because the initial shock was amplified by the materialization of imbalances that had built up in the financial sector. While the impact of asset price bubbles on macroeconomic variables has been well-documented (see, for example, Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor, 2013, 2015a,b), little is known about the role of individual financial institutions in the build-up of systemic risk in response to asset price bubbles. However, such knowledge is crucial if one wants to understand the channels through which asset price bubbles affect systemic risk and and if one wants to design appropriate policy responses.

We fill this gap in the literature by empirically analyzing the effects of asset price bubbles on systemic risk at the bank level. We analyze the link between the build-up of systemic risk at individual institutions and the occurrence of asset price bubbles in the stock and real estate market in 17 countries over almost thirty years, focusing on the role of banks' size, loan growth, leverage, and maturity mismatch as contributing factors. Additionally, we consider the role of bubble characteristics, namely their length and size. Together with differences in bank-level developments,

these bubble characteristics provide an explanation for the large heterogeneity of the effects of asset price bubbles on systemic risk across bubble episodes.

Our analysis is based on a broad, bank-level dataset spanning the time period from 1987 to 2015. The dataset contains monthly observations on 1,438 financial institutions. The empirical model aims to explain a bank's contribution to systemic risk as a function of the occurrence of financial bubbles as well as bank- and country-level characteristics. We allow for separate effects during the boom and bust phases of bubble episodes to be able to analyze both the build-up of financial imbalances as well as their materialization. We allow the effect of bubbles to depend on bank-level characteristics, namely bank size, loan growth, leverage, and maturity mismatch, as well as on bubble characteristics.

The key challenges for our analysis are twofold. First, bubble episodes need to be identified.¹ Asset price bubbles that caused deeper turmoil when bursting have attracted most attention in the literature. Relying on such bubbles could lead us to overestimate the effects of asset price bubbles on systemic risk. To prevent this sample selection bias, we instead estimate bubble episodes based on the Backward Sup Augmented Dickey-Fuller (BSADF) approach introduced by Phillips, Shi, and Yu (2015a,b). This approach identifies bubble episodes by systematically searching subsamples of price data for explosive episodes.

The second challenge lies in the quantification of systemic risk. We apply the ΔCoVaR (conditional value at risk) measure introduced by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016). This measure estimates institution-specific contributions to systemic risk and allows us to conduct the analysis at the bank level. More precisely, it measures how much the risk of the whole financial system increases as the institution in consideration gets into financial distress. We calculate the ΔCoVaR for each of the 1,438 financial institutions in our sample using all available observations from 1987 to 2015. Unlike a financial crisis dummy, the continuous measure of systemic risk also accounts for periods of high risk in the financial sector that did not result in a crisis.

¹We define an asset price bubble as the deviation of the market price of an asset from the price justified by its fundamental properties.

Our results are in line with the common conjecture that asset price bubbles pose a threat to financial stability. Specifically, our results show that the burst of an asset price bubble leads to a 14 to 18 percent increase in systemic risk compared to its average level. This effect is not limited to the turmoil following the burst of a bubble, but it exists to some extent already during its emergence. Policies aimed at preventing financial turmoil resulting from an asset price bubble should thus not solely focus on the bust period of the bubble. Instead, the risks building up in the financial system should ideally be counteracted early on. While the size of the effect of bubbles differs across asset classes, it is significant for both stock market and real estate bubbles. From a financial stability perspective, a focus on the latter hence does not appear advisable. In fact, our results suggest that, depending on the circumstances, stock market bubbles may be just as harmful.

Most importantly, the degree to which asset price bubbles threaten financial stability appears to depend strongly on banks' balance sheet characteristics. A large bank size, high loan growth, high leverage, and a large maturity mismatch increase the effect of asset price bubbles on systemic risk to up to 53 percent. These results appear to be very robust and are not driven by banks of certain size or by specific time periods. Consequently, strengthening the resilience of the financial system at the bank level can significantly decrease the system's vulnerability to asset price bubbles. Additionally, the effects depend on the specific characteristics of bubble episodes. Longer and more sizeable bubbles tend to have a stronger effect on systemic risk in a stock market boom (though not in a real estate boom), while a longer bust and a stronger previous deflation of the bubble in stocks and real estate decrease systemic risk.

The paper proceeds as follows. We start with a brief discussion of the related literature in Section 2. Section 3 elaborates on the identification of bubble episodes, the estimation of ΔCoVaR , and the dataset used in the main analyses. The empirical model is presented in Section 4, followed by the discussion of results in Section 5. We conclude with a brief discussion of policy implications in Section 6. The Appendix contains additional details on the estimation procedure as well as further tables.

2 Related Literature

Our paper contributes to the literature studying the connections between asset price bubbles, systemic risk, and financial crises. Asset price bubbles and financial crises related to the boom and bust of asset prices are recurrent features of financial systems in both developed and developing economies. Historical accounts of prominent financial bubbles have been given, among others, by Shiller (2000), Garber (2000), Kindleberger and Aliber (2005), Allen and Gale (2007), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), as well as Brunnermeier and Schnabel (2016).

The relationship between asset price bubbles and systemic risk has hardly been analyzed in a systematic way although the corresponding narrative has been known for a long time (Minsky, 1982). A more precise notion of systemic risk as a concept for the stability of entire financial systems appeared only in the late 1990s and early 2000s, which has given rise to a large literature attempting to measure systemic risk, including Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson (2010), Acharya, Engle, and Richardson (2012), Brownlees and Engle (2015) as well as Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016). An early literature review on concepts of systemic risk is provided by de Bandt and Hartmann (2000). A more recent discussion can be found in Allen, Babus, and Carletti (2012) and Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2013) who not only give comprehensive literature reviews but also discuss theoretical modeling approaches. Schularick and Taylor (2012) and Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor (2013, 2015a,b) provide a systematic econometric analysis of the impact of asset price bubbles on the likelihood and costliness of financial crises using long-run historical data. Another broad strand of the literature deals with the role of monetary policy for the development of asset price bubbles and financial stability (see, for example, Bordo and Jeanne, 2002; Galí, 2014; Galí and Gambetti, 2015; Brunnermeier and Schnabel, 2016).

Bursting asset price bubbles go along with declining asset prices that can set in motion loss and liquidity spirals in which distressed institutions are forced to sell assets, thereby further depressing prices and forcing further asset sales. Through such dynamics, systemic risk may spread well beyond the institutions affected by the initial shock. Brunnermeier (2009), Hellwig (2009) as well as Shleifer and Vishny (2011) argue that it is exactly such dynamics that allow risk to become systemic. Moreover, already Bernanke and Gertler (1989) as well as Bernanke, Gertler, and

Gilchrist (1999) pointed out that consequences of losses in net worth are usually long-lasting. Loss and liquidity spirals are the subject of a large literature, including Shleifer and Vishny (1992, 1997, 2011), Allen and Gale (1994), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997, 2005), Xiong (2001), Gromb and Vayanos (2002), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Acharya, Gale, and Yorulmazer (2011), Acharya and Viswanathan (2011), Diamond and Rajan (2011), as well as Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014). Empirical evidence on such spirals is provided, for example, by Schnabel and Shin (2004), Adrian and Shin (2010), and Gorton and Metrick (2012).

Moreover, asset price bubbles may not only trigger the materialization of financial imbalances. They can also cause the buildup of these imbalances. Rising prices increase the value of borrowers' collateral (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989) and the liquidity of assets (Kiyotaki and Moore, 2005), causing banks to increase lending and to reduce liquidity provisions. If the increases in asset prices are due to a bubble, the increased lending might turn out to be excessive and the liquidity provisions might prove insufficient. Shin (2008) provides a model considering demand-side and supply-side effects of asset prices on banks' balance sheets and the ensuing effects on individual institution's risk in the financial sector.

Our paper contributes to this literature by analyzing how asset price bubbles affect systemic risk through their effect on financial institutions. Hence, it takes the analysis of bubbles from the macroeconomic to the microeconomic level, while maintaining a systemic perspective through the measurement of risk. Bubbles as well as systemic risk are measured on the basis of quantitative procedures (see Section 3) to avoid the selection bias inherent in historical account of bubbles and financial crises. Our paper considers both the emergence of systemic risk in the boom phase as well as the materialization of risk in the bust phase of the bubble. Finally, the paper focuses on a broad set of countries and a time period of almost thirty years, thereby going well beyond the analysis of individual bubble episodes.

3 Data

Our analysis is based on a broad, bank-level dataset spanning the time period from 1987 to 2015. It hence includes not only the US subprime housing bubble which marks the beginning of the Global Financial Crisis, but also many other bubble episodes, such as the dotcom stock market

boom and bust at the end of the 1990s or the real estate boom and bust cycles around 1990 in many countries. The dataset contains monthly observations on 1,438 financial institutions located in 17 countries, yielding a total of 165,149 observations for our baseline regressions.² Table C.2 lists the number of observations per country. We see that the number of banks, and hence observations, differs widely across countries. Most importantly, the number of US banks is very large, which is driven by the large number of small publicly traded US banks. We analyze in robustness checks whether this affects our results.

In our main analyses, we explain banks' systemic risk contributions by the occurrence of bubbles in real estate or stock markets as well as by bank characteristics while controlling for macroeconomic variables. In the following subsections, we first explain the construction of the bubble indicators. Afterwards, we briefly describe the estimation of ΔCoVaR , our measure of banks' systemic risk contributions. Finally, we provide details on our bank-level data and the macroeconomic control variables.³

3.1 Bubble indicators

We identify bubble episodes by applying the Backward Sup Augmented Dickey-Fuller (BSADF) approach introduced by Phillips, Shi, and Yu (2015a,b), which is used frequently in the literature.⁴ Like many other bubble identification approaches, the BSADF approach is built around tests for explosive behavior in price data. Repeated episodes of such explosive behavior are generally difficult to distinguish from a stationary time series. For this reason, the BSADF approach applies sequences of Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests to systematically changing fractions of a sample of price data, which allows to detect asset price bubbles even when emerging in rapid succession. This property is valuable for our study as the analyzed sample typically covers more than one bubble episode per price series. The simulations in Breitung and Hogg (2012) and Phillips, Shi, and Yu (2015a) confirm that the BSADF approach outperforms comparable methods in terms of

²The included countries are: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

³Variable definitions and data sources are also provided in Table C.1 in the Appendix.

⁴E. g. by: Gutierrez (2013); Bohl, Kaufmann, and Stephan (2013); Etienne, Irwin, and Garcia (2014); Jiang, Phillips, and Yu (2015).

size and power when multiple bubble episodes occur within a dataset.⁵ Appendix A provides a detailed description of the estimation procedure.

We identify real estate bubbles using quarterly real house prices provided by the OECD for the period 1976 to 2016. Stock market bubbles are estimated based on monthly observations of country-specific MSCI indices over the period 1973 to 2016 obtained from Thomson Reuters Datastream.⁶ Each MSCI index covers 85 percent of a country's total market capitalization. The MSCI indices are computed based on a single methodological framework, which makes them comparable across countries. We include all countries for which data on both real estate and stock markets are available, which leaves us with a total of 17 OECD countries.

The BSADF approach identifies the beginning of a bubble episode as the point in time at which the sequence of BSADF test statistics first exceeds its critical value (cf. the blue and red dotted lines in Figure 1) and thus signals the price data (cf. the black line in Figure 1) being on an explosive trajectory. The end of a bubble episode is reached once the test statistics fall back below their critical values. Additionally, we distinguish between the boom and the bust phase of a bubble (cf. the blue and black shaded areas in Figure 1) based on the peak of the price series during each bubble episode. Using this approach, we construct four binary variables for each country, indicating episodes in which a real estate or stock market bubble emerges or collapses. We make these distinctions as the relationship between asset price bubbles and systemic risk is likely to differ across both asset classes and the asset price cycle. Since the real estate data are available only at quarterly frequency while our main analyses rely on a monthly frequency, the real estate bubble indicators take on the value of the corresponding quarter for each month of the quarter.

[Figure 1 about here]

⁵Comparable approaches are e. g. suggested in Kim (2000), Kim and Amador (2002), Buseti and Taylor (2004), Phillips, Shi, and Yu (2011) and Breitung and Homm (2012). Early contributions were the approaches in Shiller (1981), LeRoy and Porter (1981), West's (1987) two-step tests, integration and co-integration based tests as proposed by Diba and Grossman (1988), and tests for intrinsic bubbles as in Froot and Obstfeld (1991). See Gürkaynak (2008) for a discussion of these approaches.

⁶The data used to estimate the bubble episodes go back further than the data used in the main analysis. The larger historical coverage improves the properties of the BSADF test. Its size distortions vary between 1 and 2.2 percentage points for sample lengths between 100 and 1,600 observations. The evolution of the size distortions over increasing sample lengths is U-shaped. The power of the test is reported with 0.7 for T=100, 0.9 for T=200 and approaching 1 for T=1600 (Phillips, Shi, and Yu, 2015b).

Table 1 gives an overview of the estimated bubble episodes. We see that stock market bubbles occur more frequently but are much shorter than real estate bubbles. Overall, our sample comprises 35 real estate booms and 28 busts, while it contains 50 stock market booms and 49 busts. The number of booms and busts may differ for a country if a bubble is already in the bust phase in the beginning of our sample period or if a bubble is still in the boom phase at the end of our sample. On average, countries experienced around two real estate and three stock market bubbles. Real estate booms last on average for five year, while the bust lasts for only one year. Stock market booms last on average less than two years and the busts last only half a year. The shorter lifespan of stock market bubbles is consistent with real estate prices being more slow-moving.

[Table 1 about here]

Figure 2 displays the occurrence of booms and busts per country. We see that stock market bubble episodes are clustered around but not limited to the run-up to the Global Financial Crisis, the dotcom bubble as well as the mid-1980s. Real estate bubbles are much more persistent, especially since the 2000s when most countries experienced a real estate bubble.

[Figure 2 about here]

We cross-check our estimation results by comparing the estimated bubble episodes with those identified in the literature. All episodes discussed in the literature are also identified by our estimations. It is still conceivable that we identify too many bubble episodes. However, the prevalent bubble episodes in the literature are mostly those which were followed by financial sector turmoil after their burst. Since we find a positive effect of asset price bubbles on systemic risk, falsely labeling episodes free of such repercussions as bubbles would bias our results towards not finding a relationship between bubbles and systemic risk, i.e. to an underestimation of the true effect.

3.2 Systemic risk contributions

Our goal is to link the occurrence of asset price bubbles to systemic risk contributions of individual financial institutions. One of the most prominent measures of systemic risk contributions

is ΔCoVaR introduced by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016).⁷ It quantifies the contribution of a financial institution to the overall level of systemic risk by estimating the additional value at risk of the entire financial system associated with this institution experiencing distress.

The estimates rely on tail dependencies between losses in the market value of equity of individual institutions and those of the entire financial system. One of the advantages of ΔCoVaR is that it controls for general risk factors such that, for instance, a high volatility in stock markets does not automatically lead to a high estimated level of systemic risk. The estimation procedure allows these control variables to have a distinct effect for each institution such that the general risk factors are controlled for in a much more precise way than by the simply inclusion of additional control variables in our main analyses. Our estimation strategy closely follows Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016).

To control for general risk factors as precisely as possible, we define four financial systems, namely North America, Europe, Japan, and Australia, and use a distinct set of state variables for each system. Given the limited number of banks in some countries of our sample (cf. Table C.2), a definition of financial systems on a pure country basis is undesirable as it would contradict the very nature of the risk we intend to measure, namely the risk being systemic. Details on the state variables as well as on the estimation strategy are provided in Appendix B.

For the estimation, we collect market equity data from Thomson Reuters Datastream for all listed financial institutions located in the 17 countries in our sample. As we additionally need balance sheet data in the main analyses, we include only those listed institutions for which such data is reported in the form of consolidated statements in Bankscope. Additionally, banks with less than 260 weeks of equity market observations are discarded to ensure convergence of the quantile regressions. This approach leaves us with monthly estimates of ΔCoVaR for 1,438 financial institutions.

⁷The Option-iPoD (Capuano, 2008), the DIP (Huang, Zhou, and Zhu, 2009), the measures introduced in Segoviano and Goodhart (2009) as well as in Gray and Jobst (2010), SES (Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson, 2010; Acharya, Engle, and Richardson, 2012), ΔCoJPoD (Radev, 2013, 2014), realized systemic risk beta (Hautsch, Schaumburg, and Schienle, 2015), and SRISK (Acharya, Engle, and Richardson, 2012; Brownlees and Engle, 2015) also allow the estimation of systemic risk contributions.

Table 2 provides summary statistics for ΔCoVaR and the other covariates. The mean of ΔCoVaR equals 1.96 such that distress at one institution is associated with an average increase in the financial system’s conditional value at risk by 1.96 percentage points. Figure 3 displays the evolution of the average ΔCoVaR in the four considered financial systems over time. All four financial systems show a marked peak in ΔCoVaR at the time of the Global Financial Crisis. Other times of distress in the financial system such as the Euro Area crisis or the Japanese banking crisis at the beginning of the 1990s. In contrast, the dotcom crisis is hardly visible in the ΔCoVaR series.

[Table 2 about here]

[Figure 3 about here]

3.3 Bank-level variables and macroeconomic controls

Systemic risk at the individual level is driven by bank characteristics. In addition, the effects of asset price bubbles may also depend on bank characteristics. For instance, if banks individually are in bad shape, financial stability is likely to be more vulnerable to asset price bubbles. Therefore, we control for important balance sheet characteristics, namely bank size, loan growth, leverage, and maturity mismatch. In addition, we interact these variables with the bubble indicators in order to capture the varying susceptibility of banks to systemic effects from asset price bubbles.

Bank balance sheet data are obtained from Bankscope. It has been shown in earlier research that size (measured as the logarithm of total assets), leverage (defined as total assets divided by equity), and maturity mismatch (i. e., short-term liabilities minus short-term assets, divided by total assets) drive an institution’s systemic risk contribution (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2016). We additionally shed light on the role of loan growth ($\Delta\log(\text{loans})$) as credit-fueled bubbles are perceived to be particularly harmful (Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor, 2015b; Brunnermeier and Schnabel, 2016). We apply cubic spline interpolations to obtain monthly observations. Moreover, we winsorize some bank-level variables at the 1-percent and 99-percent level to, e. g., deal with extreme values of leverage of institutions on the brink of default and extraordinary high loan growth of institutions starting from a very low level of loans.

Table 2 shows that the median bank is very small with total assets of around 2 billion US dollars and that size varies greatly. In our analyses, we also address whether small and large banks' systemic risk contributions are affected differently by asset price bubbles beyond what is controlled for by controlling for total assets. Average loan growth is close to zero but our sample contains many observations with high positive and high negative growth rates. The median bank has a leverage of 11.7 and a median maturity mismatch of 0.75, again with a wide variation.

In addition to bank-level variables, we control for a number of macroeconomic variables. To this end, we obtain data on credit to the private non-financial sector from the BIS. Data on investment, 10-year government bond rates, the CPI and GDP are from the OECD. Data on policy rates are taken from the OECD, Thomson Reuters Datastream and national central banks. Variables at quarterly frequency are adjusted to monthly frequency using cubic spline interpolations.

As seen in Table 2, average real GDP growth is 2.1 percent in our sample period. 10-year government bond rates are on average 4.2 percent and inflation rates 2.1 percent. Investment-to-GDP growth is slightly negative on average, and credit-to-GDP growth is equal to 1 percent. Looking at the maxima and minima, we can see that the sample includes severe recessions as well as strong booms and hence mirrors the diverse macroeconomic developments of our 17 sample countries over the sample period of almost thirty years.

4 Empirical model

To analyze the effect of asset price bubbles on systemic risk, we regress the systemic risk contributions ($\Delta CoVaR_{i,t}$) of institution i at time t on bank fixed effects (α_i), the four bubbles indicators for the episodes of booms and busts of stock market and real estate bubbles ($Bubble_{c,t}$) in country c at time t , the lagged bank-level variables size, loan growth, leverage, and maturity mismatch ($B_{i,t-1}$), the respective interaction terms with the bubble indicators, and the lagged country-specific macroeconomic control variables ($C_{c,t-1}$):

$$\Delta CoVaR_{i,t} = \alpha_i + \beta \cdot Bubble_{c,t} + \gamma \cdot B_{i,t-1} + \delta \cdot Bubble_{c,t} \cdot B_{i,t-1} + \lambda \cdot C_{c,t-1} + u_{i,t} . \quad (1)$$

A larger value of ΔCoVaR corresponds to a higher systemic risk contribution. Consequently, we expect a positive sign of all coefficients included in β as this would represent a positive effect of asset price bubbles on systemic risk. The bank-level variables allow us to control for the most important bank-specific risk factors that are known to drive the systemic risk contributions measured by ΔCoVaR (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2016). The interaction terms with the bubble indicators are included as we expect the bank characteristics to have a different effect during bubble episodes compared to normal times. For instance, loan growth at the bank level might be a good thing for financial stability in normal times. However, in the presence of a bubble and to the extent that the loans finance the bubble, loan growth increases a bank's exposure to the bubble itself and should thus increase its systemic risk contribution. Put differently, the effect of a bubble on institution-specific systemic risk is likely to depend on this institution's balance sheet characteristics. In our regressions, the bank-level variables enter the regressions in a demeaned fashion such that the coefficients on the bubble indicators can be interpreted as a bubble's effect for a bank of *average* size, loan growth, leverage, and maturity mismatch.

On a country level, we control for real GDP growth ($\Delta\log(\text{real GDP})$) to capture national business cycles. The 10-year government bond rates (in logs) account for the potential nexus between sovereigns and banks. In a robustness check (not reported), we used monetary policy rates instead, as extended periods of low rates can cause the build-up of risks in the financial sector by driving banks into overly risky investments and inadequate risk buffers (Diamond and Rajan, 2012).⁸ Our results are robust towards the choice of the interest rate. The inflation rate ($\Delta\log(\text{CPI})$) has been identified as a factor contributing to the occurrence of financial crises (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998). Growth of investment to GDP growth ($\Delta\log(\text{investment}/\text{GDP})$) is included to control for the use of credit (investment versus consumption, see Schularick and Taylor, 2012). Finally, credit-to-GDP growth ($\Delta\log(\text{credit}/\text{GDP})$) is used to control for potentially harmful credit booms on an aggregate level, where we use credit to the private non-financial sector as it is more likely to fuel a bubble.

⁸Also see the discussion in the context of the recent financial crisis in Deutsche Bundesbank (2014).

Standard errors are clustered at the bank and country-time level. The latter corresponds to the level at which the main explanatory variables, the bubble indicators, display variation. The clustering at the bank level accounts for autocorrelation, included that introduced by interpolation of the data (see Section 3). Clustering at the bank and country level (as opposed to the bank and country-time level) does not alter the estimated significance levels qualitatively.

We do not include time fixed effects as they would capture global factors and thereby alter the interpretation of the estimated effects in an undesirable way. To clarify the argument, suppose we had only two countries in the sample and both countries would exhibit a bubble at the same time. In specifications with global time fixed effects, the coefficients on the bubble indicators would capture effects relative to the global average. That is, in the country with a weaker effect of the bubble, the coefficients would signal a negative effect (relative to the global average). However, we do not want to estimate such relative effects, but the absolute effects on systemic risk. In some regressions, we include country-time fixed effects instead, which improves identification but also absorbs a lot of variation. The results are qualitatively unchanged.

5 Results

The subsequent exposition of results starts with the exploration of the effect of bubble episodes on systemic risk in Section 5.1. In Section 5.2, we analyze the relevance of bank-level developments during bubble episodes. Afterwards, we shift focus towards the role of bubble characteristics in Section 5.3. We conclude our presentation of results by the presentation of additional robustness checks in Section 5.4.

5.1 Asset price bubbles and systemic risk in booms and busts

We start this subsection by illustrating the underlying correlations without allowing for heterogeneous effects across banks. First, ΔCoVaR is regressed on the bubble indicators and bank fixed effects only. The coefficients of three out of the four bubble indicators are positive and significant (Table 3, column 1). Overall, asset price bubbles are associated with a significant increase in systemic risk, which is in line with our expectation. The largest effect is found for real estate busts. Only real estate booms are not significantly related to systemic risk in the basic regression.

When looking at individual countries (results not reported), we find a significant positive association between asset price bubbles and systemic risk for twelve out of 17 countries in our sample. The relationship is insignificant in four countries and significantly negative only in a single country and only in the boom period.⁹ Hence, the underlying correlation is pervasive in our sample and is not driven by individual countries.

[Table 3 about here]

When including the macroeconomic control variables, the size of the coefficients of the bubble indicators change but the direction of estimated effects and their significance prevail (Table 3, column 2). The coefficient of real estate busts decreases, while that on stock market booms increases. This is driven by the fact that part of the variation of bubble indicators is now captured by the macroeconomic control variables. When adding the bank-level variables the estimated coefficients once more change only quantitatively (Table 3, column 3). Specifically, the estimated effect of the bust phase of real estate bubbles becomes smaller while remaining significant. The estimated effects of stock market bubbles increase slightly.

To assess the economic significance of the results, consider the effect of a stock market boom or bust. Such episodes *ceteris paribus* lead to an increase in the financial system's conditional VaR associated with a single institution's distress by 0.36 percentage points. Intuitively, this coefficient reflects how much more a single institution's distress endangers the functioning of the financial system during a stock market boom or bust. Since this effect occurs for all institutions within a country at the same time, it translates into an increase in systemic risk at the country level. Hence, the increase in systemic risk caused by a stock market boom or bust corresponds to 18% ($=0.36/1.96$) relative to the mean level of ΔCoVaR (or 21% relative to the median of 1.68). The corresponding increase caused by the burst of real estate bubbles amounts to 14 percent (or 17 percent). Asset price bubbles thus can significantly raise systemic risk and hence threaten to

⁹The negative correlation is found for the asset price bubbles in Denmark. Insignificant correlations are estimated for Switzerland, Germany, Portugal and Sweden. These results are obtained without distinguishing between asset classes due to the low number of bubble episodes per country per asset class.

impair the functioning of the financial system. While real estate busts appear to be more harmful than booms, booms and busts are equally harmful in the case of stock market bubbles.

The coefficients of bank-level controls are in line with the previous literature. As in Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016), the systemic risk contributions increase in the size of an institution as well as in leverage, but decrease in an institution's maturity mismatch.¹⁰ Moreover, higher bank lending appears to lead to lower systemic risk. Note, however, that we are already controlling for aggregate lending growth. We will see below that all of these effects prevail in the absence of asset price bubbles, but partly differ in the presence of a bubble.

The effects of the macroeconomic control variables are largely in line with expectations. High GDP growth lowers systemic risk, while higher inflation raises it. A credit boom on the aggregate level leads to increased systemic risk (though not significantly). High investment-to-GDP growth is negatively associated with systemic risk. Somewhat surprisingly, the effect of the 10-year government bond rate is negative and significant. Hence, there is no evidence of a sovereign-bank nexus over this broad sample period.

5.2 The role of bank characteristics

The results presented in the previous subsection point towards a harmful effect of asset price bubbles on financial stability. Additionally, they underline the importance of bank-level characteristics for banks' systemic risk contributions. We now turn to the core of our analysis, which is the role of bank characteristics for the effects of asset price bubbles on systemic risk. While the burst of an asset price bubble is a shock that itself threatens financial stability, a bank's susceptibility to asset price bubbles is likely to depend on its balance sheet characteristics. Moreover, the emergence of asset price bubbles can lure banks into behavior such as over-lending and inadequate liquidity management which threatens the stability of the financial system, thereby increasing the financial system's vulnerability to the subsequent shock of the burst. Therefore, we now additionally interact the four bubble indicators with the bank-level characteristics. The corresponding

¹⁰ Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) define the maturity mismatch inverse to our definition such that the different sign of the corresponding coefficient in our paper is in line with the respective finding in Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016).

regression results are provided in Table 4. Column 1 of this table reports our baseline regression which includes the bubble indicators, bank-level controls, interactions of bank-level controls with the bubble indicators, macroeconomic control variables, as well as bank fixed effects.

[Table 4 about here]

The inclusion of interaction terms leaves the coefficients of the bubble indicators largely unchanged. However, it changes their interpretation. They now quantify the effects of asset price bubbles on systemic risk in case of bank characteristics corresponding to their average levels in our sample. Moreover, the inclusion of the interaction terms changes the interpretation of the coefficients of the bank characteristics. They now refer to the base effect in normal times, i.e., outside of bubble episodes. The estimated effects of bank characteristics during non-bubble times are very similar to before. While size and leverage increase systemic risk, individual loan growth and maturity match decrease it.

More importantly, the effects change markedly during bubble episodes. For example, the effect of size rises sharply during real estate busts as well as stock market booms and busts. Loan growth has a significantly more positive effect during all types of bubble episodes such that the beneficial effect of loan growth in the absence of a bubble is gone once a bubble is present. For real estate busts, the results suggest that systemic risk contributions even increase in lending growth. The sum of the coefficients of loan growth and of its interaction with real estate busts is positive and statistically significant (test not reported). Similarly, the effect of maturity mismatch is more positive during all types of bubble episodes. The results on leverage are more mixed as its effect is higher only during real estate booms while it is not significantly different during real estate busts and lower during stock market bubbles. Overall, this regression strongly supports the relevance of banks' balance sheet characteristics for the effect of asset price bubbles on systemic risk.

The second and third columns of Table 4 contain robustness checks to our main specification. In column 2, we rerun the regression using quarterly data to ensure that the interpolation of the indicator for real estate bubbles does not drive any results. While standard errors increase due to the much smaller number of observations, the overall results prevail. The same is true when we

include country-time fixed effects. In this specification (displayed in column 3) all variables varying only at the country-time level (i.e. the bubble indicators and macroeconomic control variables) drop out. However, we can assess the robustness of our results regarding the bank-level variables as well as their interactions with the bubble indicators. Again, the statistical significance of the estimated coefficients is reduced due to the reduction in the degrees of freedom. At the same time, the basic results are maintained remarkably well, which provides strong support for our previous results.

In order to get a more comprehensive view of the role of the bank characteristics, we now condition the bubble indicators on different percentiles of the bank-level variables. While the coefficients of the bubble indicators in Table 4 display the effects of the different bubble indicators on systemic risk *at the mean* of all bank-level variables, Table 5 depicts their effects *at different percentiles* of the bank-level variables, starting from the median (50%) and going up to the 95th percentile of size, loan growth, leverage, and maturity mismatch simultaneously. These results hence provide an assessment of the economic significance of the effects of bank characteristics. Since all other coefficients in the regression are unaffected by the alternative conditioning compared to column 1 of Table 4, we do not display them again in Table 5.

[Table 5 about here]

Moving from the left to the right, Table 5 shows that the effect of asset price bubbles on systemic risk increases with the percentile on which we condition. All coefficients increase sharply when moving to higher percentiles of bank characteristics. Hence, the higher the bank-specific risk factors, the more vulnerable is the financial system to asset price bubbles.

Interestingly, we now find that real estate bubbles can already be harmful during their emergence if accompanied by sufficiently unfavorable developments at the bank level (Table 5, columns 3 and 4). Like in the case of stock market bubbles, the harmful effects of real estate bubbles are thus not limited to the turmoil induced by the burst of the bubble. Generally, the effect of an asset price bubble is more pronounced during the bust period compared to the boom. The burst of an asset price bubble can increase systemic risk by up to 53% ($=1.04/1.96$) compared to average levels

of ΔCoVaR . The risks connected to the emergence of an asset price bubble cannot be neglected either. The boom phase of a bubble raises systemic risk by up to 27% ($=0.52/1.96$).

Parts of the literature (e. g., Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor, 2015b) conjecture that real estate bubbles are more harmful than their stock market counterparts. Our results do not support this general ordering. Instead, we find the bust phase of real estate bubble episodes to be more harmful only if accompanied by a very large size of banks, high loan growth, high maturity mismatch and high leverage, i. e., if bank-specific risk factors are beyond the 75th percentile of their distribution. If banks display more favorable risk characteristics during bubble episodes, stock market bubbles appear to be more harmful than real estate bubbles according to our estimations (see Table 5). These results are in line with a higher importance of developments within the financial sector compared to a bubble’s asset class, as has already been advocated by Brunnermeier and Schnabel (2016) with respect to loan growth.

While we emphasize the importance of bank characteristics for the harmfulness of asset price bubbles, we interpret our results on specific variables with caution. Our dependent variable is an estimate of systemic risk. While the measure we rely on is widely used, other measures, such as SRISK (Acharya, Engle, and Richardson, 2012; Brownlees and Engle, 2015), offer a reasonable alternative for the estimation of systemic risk contributions. In the aggregate, this measure shows a similar evolution over time as ΔCoVaR . However, SRISK is known to be driven by bank-level characteristics to different extents. While ΔCoVaR , e. g., reacts more to the size of banks, SRISK is driven more by leverage (cf. e. g., Benoit, Colletaz, Hurlin, and Pérignon, 2013). The size of the effects of specific bank-level variables on systemic risk should thus not be over-interpreted.

5.3 The role of bubble characteristics

The observed heterogeneity of the effects of different bubble episodes is likely to be driven not only by differences in bank characteristics but also by differences in bubble characteristics. One important characteristic is the duration of a bubble episode (*length*). Emerging asset price bubbles might be more harmful the longer they have lasted already as they may feed back into banks’ risk-taking and thereby become self-reinforcing. In contrast, after a longer bust phase the bubble may be less harmful because the shock of its burst fades out. A second characteristic is the size

of a bubble (*size*). The larger the emerging bubble, the higher is the potential for a pronounced bust. Hence, larger bubbles would be expected to increase systemic risk more. During the bust, the remaining risk should be smaller the more the bubble has deflated already.

As before, we distinguish between the booms and busts of real estate and stock market bubbles, respectively. Consequently, we construct four new variables for each bubble characteristic, resulting in a total of eight new variables. *Length* counts the number of months that a bubble has been building up since its inception or collapsing since its peak. During the boom phase, *size* is the deviation of the underlying asset's price series from its pre-bubble level relative to this pre-bubble level. During the bust, *size* measures the size of the bust (as opposed to the size of the bubble) as the negative of the deviation of the asset's price from the peak of the price series relative to the peak level. Outside the respective bubble phases, all *length* and *size* variables are set to zero:

$$\text{Boom_length}_{c,t} = \begin{cases} l_{boom}^c & \text{if } t \in [\tau_0^{k,c}, \tau_{peak}^{k,c}] \text{ for any } k \text{ and } c \\ 0 & \text{else} \end{cases}, \text{ where } l_{boom}^c = t - \tau_0^{k,c} + 1, \quad (2)$$

$$\text{Bust_length}_{c,t} = \begin{cases} l_{bust}^c & \text{if } t \in]\tau_{peak}^{k,c}, \tau_T^{k,c}] \text{ for any } k \text{ and } c \\ 0 & \text{else} \end{cases}, \text{ where } l_{bust}^c = t - \tau_{peak}^{k,c} + 1, \quad (3)$$

$$\text{Boom_size}_{c,t} = \begin{cases} \frac{p_t - p_{\tau_0^{k,c}-1}}{p_{\tau_0^{k,c}-1}} & \text{if } t \in [\tau_0^{k,c}, \tau_{peak}^{k,c}] \text{ for any } k \text{ and } c \\ 0 & \text{else} \end{cases}, \quad (4)$$

$$\text{Bust_size}_{c,t} = \begin{cases} -\frac{p_t - p_{\tau_{peak}^{k,c}}}{p_{\tau_{peak}^{k,c}}} & \text{if } t \in]\tau_{peak}^{k,c}, \tau_T^{k,c}] \text{ for any } k \text{ and } c \\ 0 & \text{else} \end{cases}, \quad (5)$$

where we denote the beginning of bubble episode k in country c by $\tau_0^{k,c}$, the corresponding end by $\tau_T^{k,c}$, and the point in time at which the price series reaches its peak by $\tau_{peak}^{k,c}$. p_t refers to the price of the underlying real estate or stock market price series at time t .

Table 6 displays the summary statistics of the bubble characteristics. The descriptive statistics shown in the table refer only to those periods where a bubble is actually identified. In all other periods, the variables are set to zero. In contrast to Table 1, the variable *length* refers to the

time that has passed since the inception or peak of the bubbles so that the numbers differ. In a stock market boom, prices are on average 78% above the initial value. In a real estate boom, the corresponding number is only 38%. The maximum size of stock market booms is 842% above the initial value. For real estate booms, the maximum is only 171%. In a stock market bust, prices are on average 12% below the peak price, while in a real estate bust, prices are only 6% below the peak. The maximum drop in a stock market bust amounts to 35% below its peak, whereas this number is 43% for real estate busts.

[Table 6 about here]

Adding these variables to our baseline model (see Equation (1)), we estimate regressions of the form

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta CoVaR_{i,t} = & \alpha_i + \beta_1 \cdot Bubble_{c,t} + \beta_2 \cdot Bubble_characteristics_{c,t} \\ & + \gamma \cdot B_{i,t-1} + \delta \cdot Bubble_{c,t} * B_{i,t-1} + \lambda \cdot C_{c,t-1} + u_{i,t} . \end{aligned} \quad (6)$$

The variables capturing bubble characteristics enter the regressions in a demeaned fashion such that the coefficients on the bubble indicators quantify the effect of a bubble with average bubble characteristics.

As expected, we find stock market bubbles to be more harmful the longer they have lasted and the larger their size is during the emergence (Table 7, columns 2 and 3). Since *length* and *size* are highly correlated during the emergence of stock market bubbles (0.97), it is difficult to distinguish their effects empirically. The economic significance is large for both characteristics. For example, an emerging stock market bubble of a size at the 75th percentile of the size distribution (1.32) increases $\Delta CoVaR$ by 0.45 percentage points more than a bubble of a size at the 25th percentile (0.26), which is large compared to the sample average of $\Delta CoVaR$ (1.96). The equivalent comparison for *length* reveals a similarly large difference of 0.47 percentage points. During stock market busts, the bubble is less harmful the more time has passed since the burst of the bubble, which is in line with our expectations. The economic significance of the effect of *length* is smaller than during the boom. The change from the 25th (14) to the 75th percentile (45) of the distribution of length results in

0.18 percentage points lower effect on ΔCoVaR . The initial shock of the bursting bubble fades out. Additionally, policy interventions might alleviate the consequences of the burst at later stages of the bust. The size of the bust is negatively related to systemic risk but the coefficient is insignificant.

[Table 7 about here]

Regarding real estate booms, bubbles that have built up over a long time unexpectedly are less harmful than those that emerged only recently. Hence, the reinforcing mechanisms described above appear to be less prevalent in real estate markets. The effect of the size of the bubble is negative but insignificant. During the bust phase of real estate bubbles and in line with our results on stock market busts, the coefficients of *length* and *size* are negative and significant. The effect of a bubble on systemic risk appears to be smaller the more time has passed since the burst and the more a bubble has deflated already. A real estate bust at the 75th percentile of the corresponding size distribution (0.09) increases ΔCoVaR by 0.13 percentage points less than such a bust at the 25th percentile (0.01). The equivalent comparison for the length of the bust (16 vs. 5) reveals a 0.10 percentage point difference. This again points towards a fading effect of the burst and policy interventions alleviating financial sector turmoil.

The results show that bubble characteristics such as length and size influence the effect of asset price bubbles on systemic risk in addition to bank characteristics. Consequently, differences in the developments of bubbles themselves provide an explanation for the heterogeneity of effects of asset price bubbles on financial stability across bubble episodes. From a policy perspective, at least for stock market booms, it seems to be important to identify and fight bubbles early on to avoid destabilizing dynamics in the financial sector. For real estate booms, this appears to be less important.

5.4 Robustness

In this subsection, we assess the robustness of our baseline results in several directions. First, we analyze the sensitivity of results with respect to banks' size by considering sample splits. This also helps us to check whether the dominance of US banks in our sample is driving the results. Second, we evaluate whether the results are driven by the Global Financial Crisis, which stands out due to its spike in systemic risk.

5.4.1 Small versus large banks

In order to check whether the results differ across banks of different size, we split the sample into large and small banks. In order to avoid banks switching groups over time, the split is based on a bank's mean size over the sample period. Banks with a mean size below (above) 30 billion USD are considered as small (large). The results are robust towards the choice of the cut-off value.

The distinction between large and small banks serves three purposes. First, as mentioned in Section 3, the dataset is dominated by relatively small banks, especially from the US (see Table C.2). Small US banks are much more frequently listed than, e. g., small European banks. We make use of the subsequent analysis to assess the importance of US observations for our results. Second, in the baseline regressions, we assume that a bank is affected only by a bubble in its home country. For large and internationally active banks, this assumption is rather strong. A focus on small, locally active banks allows us to address this potential concern. Third, small and large banks display different business models and dynamics, which might not be fully captured by bank fixed effects and the size variable.

Columns 1 and 2 in Table 8 show the results for large and small banks. We see that the results for both banks groups are very similar to our baseline results. As before, real estate busts as well as stock market booms and bust strongly affect systemic risk contributions. We also confirmed that the previous finding that the emergence of real estate bubbles is harmful for financial stability when individual bank risk factors are at elevated levels (results not displayed).

Moreover, many of the interaction terms remain significant, pointing towards a more pronounced effects of asset price bubbles on riskier banks. Only the coefficients on the size interactions are somewhat different from previous results, at least for large banks. In general, the coefficients for large banks are substantially bigger than for small banks. However, this result disappears when the left-hand-side variable is transformed into logs (see columns 4 and 5). Hence, in proportional terms, the size of the coefficients is comparable. Given the similarity of results across bank groups, we can exclude that the results are driven by banks that are affected by asset price bubbles emerging outside their home country. Moreover, our previous results do not seem to have been driven by small banks alone.

[Table 8 about here]

While the dominance of US banks is mitigated substantially in the sample of large banks, the same is not true for the sample of small banks. Therefore, in another robustness check, we drop the smallest US banks (again based on mean bank size) such that the number of observations from the US is no larger than that of the country with the second largest number of observations on small banks (France). We find that the results are qualitatively very similar to those from the total sample of small banks (see columns 3 and 6). Most (though not all) coefficients have the same signs and similar levels of significance. Overall, the regressions from Table 8 are well in line with the full-sample results. Both the results on the general effect of bubbles as well as those on the importance of the interactions with bank-level variables are confirmed.

5.4.2 Choice of sample period

As a further robustness check, we analyze the sensitivity of our results to the choice of the sample period. As Figure 3 shows, ΔCoVaR spikes especially during the Global Financial Crisis. To exclude that the results are driven by either particular bubble episodes, we re-estimate our baseline regressions for different sample periods. First, we leave out the year 2008, in which ΔCoVaR spikes to avoid that these extreme observations drive our results. Second, we exclude the entire financial crisis and consider only the period up to 2006. Moreover, in the beginning of our sample, the number of included banks is relatively small and the sample of included banks may not be representative for this time period. Therefore, we run a regression excluding observations before 1995.

As shown in Table 9, the results are very consistent across different sample periods. The signs and significance of coefficients are almost always identical to the baseline regression shown in column 1. The results are highly robust to the exclusion of the initial period of our sample (see Table 9, column 2). Excluding the Global Financial Crisis yields even stronger effects of asset price bubbles, especially for real estate booms (Table 9, columns 3 and 4). Most importantly, the coefficient of the real estate booms now becomes highly significant.

[Table 9 about here]

Consequently, none of our results is driven by banks of a particular size or by particular bubble episodes.

6 Conclusion

Analyzing a broad sample of banks in 17 OECD countries over the period 1987 to 2015, this paper empirically assesses the effects of asset price bubbles on systemic risk. While most of the previous empirical literature has approached this question at a macroeconomic level, we provide evidence on how asset price bubbles raise systemic risk through their effects on individual financial institutions.

Our results show that asset price bubbles are associated with increased systemic risk at the level of the individual financial institutions. This relationship is not limited to the turmoil following the burst of a bubble, but it already exists during its emergence. Most importantly, we show that the effect of bubbles on systemic risk depends strongly on bank characteristics. A large bank size, higher loan growth, higher leverage, and a stronger maturity mismatch make financial institutions, and hence the financial system, vulnerable to asset price bubbles. If accompanied by sufficiently elevated levels of these bank-specific risk factors, asset price bubbles can increase systemic risk by up to 53 percent. Moreover, our results do not support the common conjecture that real estate bubbles are generally more harmful than stock market bubbles. In fact, the ordering may even be reversed for certain levels of bank characteristics. The results are neither driven by banks of a particular size nor by specific sample periods. Finally, the analysis of bubble characteristics reveals the importance of the length and the size of the bubble for their effects on systemic risk.

Our results have a number of interesting policy implications. First, stock market bubbles cannot be dismissed as a source of financial instability but have to be watched just as closely as real estate bubbles. Second, our results suggest that policies focusing on managing the turmoil after the burst of a bubble are insufficient. Systemic risk rises already in the boom phase and it is well-advisable to counteract such a build-up of systemic risk early on to avoid a harmful collapse later on. Finally, and most importantly, our results suggest that the adverse effects of bubbles

can be mitigated substantially by strengthening the resilience of financial institutions. Bank size, loan growth, leverage, and maturity mismatch all contribute to the build-up of financial instability through asset price bubbles and hence increase the system's vulnerability. With strong and resilient financial institutions, the fallout from bursting bubbles is likely to be much smaller.

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7 Figures and tables

Figure 1: Construction of the bubble indicators

The BSADF approach identifies the beginning of a bubble episode as the point in time at which the sequence of BSADF test statistics (blue dotted line) first exceeds its critical value (red dotted line) and thus signals the price data (black line) being on an explosive trajectory. The end of a bubble episode is reached once the test statistics fall back below their critical values. Additionally, we distinguish between the boom and the bust phase of a bubble (the blue and black shaded areas) based on the peak of the price series during each bubble episode. Using this approach, we construct four binary variables for each country, indicating episodes in which a real estate or stock market bubble emerges or collapses. The figure illustrates the construction of these indicators based on the recent Spanish Housing Bubble. Details on the BSADF approach are provided in Section 3.1 and Appendix A.





Figure 2: Bubble episodes by country and asset class

Periods colored in blue represent the boom phase of an asset price bubble, periods in gray refer to the bust phase of a bubble. For details on the estimation procedure see Section 3.1 and Appendix A.

(a) Stock Market Bubble Episodes



(b) Real Estate Bubble Episodes




Figure 3: Evolution of ΔCoVaR over time

The figure displays the unweighted mean of ΔCoVaR in weekly percentage points for the four financial systems in our sample: North America, Europe, Japan, and Australia. Details on the estimation procedure are provided in Section 3.2 and Appendix B.




Table 1: Descriptive statistics on bubble episodes

The statistics are computed for the dataset used in the main analyses. Figure 2 provides an overview of bubble episodes estimated per country. Differences in the number of booms and busts of bubble episodes are due to bubbles that take place only partly during the sample period.

	Real estate		Stock market	
	Boom	Bust	Boom	Bust
Number of episodes				
Average per country	1.9	1.6	2.8	2.7
Min per country	1	0	1	1
Max per country	4	5	5	5
Total	35	28	50	49
Length of episodes				
Average	60	13	21	6
Min	10	1	3	1
Max	318	93	64	37

Table 2: Descriptive statistics

The statistics are computed for the dataset used in the main analyses. “Size” and “Interest Rate” enter the regressions in logs. “Interest Rate” refers to 10-year government bond rates. For descriptive statistics on the bubble episodes see Table 1. Variable definitions are provided in Table C.1.

Variable	Mean	Median	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Dependent variable					
ΔCoVaR	1.96	1.68	1.65	-9.33	26.12
Bank characteristics					
Bank size [billion USD]	67.19	2.02	266.87	0.02	3,807.89
log(bank size)	1.23	0.64	2.19	-2.39	7.20
Loan growth	0.007	0.006	0.015	-0.046	0.074
Leverage	13.43	11.70	7.14	1.04	52.51
Maturity mismatch	0.69	0.75	0.19	-0.10	0.89
Macroeconomic variables					
Real GDP growth	0.021	0.022	0.020	-0.102	0.076
Interest rate	4.21	4.20	1.81	0.12	15.14
log(interest rate)	1.33	1.43	0.51	-2.12	2.72
Inflation	0.021	0.021	0.013	-0.025	0.123
Investment-to-GDP growth	-0.004	0.010	0.061	-0.501	0.274
Credit-to-GDP growth	0.010	0.014	0.035	-0.129	0.207

Table 3: Asset price bubbles and systemic risk in booms and busts

Dependent variable: systemic risk estimated by ΔCoVaR . “... boom” and “... bust” indicate the respective bubble phases estimated by the BSADF approach. “Interest rate” refers to 10-year government bond rates. Variable definitions are provided in Table C.1. Standard errors are clustered at the bank and country-time level. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. P-values are in parentheses.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Real estate boom	0.02 (0.604)	0.07 (0.251)	0.04 (0.573)
Real estate bust	0.50*** (0.000)	0.38*** (0.003)	0.28** (0.032)
Stock market boom	0.11** (0.027)	0.29*** (0.000)	0.36*** (0.000)
Stock market bust	0.27*** (0.000)	0.33*** (0.000)	0.36*** (0.000)
log(Bank size)			0.28*** (0.000)
Loan growth			-0.84** (0.047)
Leverage			0.01*** (0.001)
Maturity mismatch			-0.45*** (0.000)
GDP growth		-5.90*** (0.000)	-4.32*** (0.001)
log(Interest rate)		-0.28*** (0.000)	-0.06* (0.076)
Inflation		6.25* (0.064)	6.80** (0.041)
Investment-to-GDP growth		-0.50 (0.123)	-0.72** (0.031)
Credit-to-GDP growth		1.15 (0.117)	1.18 (0.100)
Bank FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
No. of banks	1,264	1,264	1,264
No. of obs.	165,149	165,149	165,149
Adj. R ²	0.810	0.817	0.823
Adj. R ² within	0.037	0.073	0.100

Table 4: The role of bank characteristics during bubble episodes

Dependent variable: systemic risk estimated by ΔCoVaR . “... boom” and “... bust” indicate the respective bubble phases estimated by the BSADF approach. “Interest rate” refers to 10-year government bond rates. Variable definitions are provided in Table C.1. The results in column 2 are obtained from regressions based on quarterly frequency as a robustness check regarding our use of interpolated data. Standard errors are clustered at the bank and country-time level. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. P-values are in parentheses.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Real estate boom	0.00 (0.935)	0.06 (0.288)	
Real estate bust	0.24* (0.055)	0.37*** (0.002)	
Stock market boom	0.33*** (0.000)	0.24*** (0.000)	
Stock market bust	0.36*** (0.000)	0.49*** (0.000)	
log(Bank size)	0.27*** (0.000)	0.22*** (0.000)	0.01 (0.818)
log(Bank size) · Real estate boom	0.00 (0.895)	0.01 (0.500)	-0.04* (0.093)
log(Bank size) · Real estate bust	0.15*** (0.000)	0.15*** (0.001)	0.20*** (0.000)
log(Bank size) · Stock market boom	0.05*** (0.007)	0.03 (0.122)	0.07*** (0.001)
log(Bank size) · Stock market bust	0.11*** (0.000)	0.14*** (0.000)	0.14*** (0.000)
Loan growth	-4.38*** (0.000)	-4.33*** (0.000)	-2.01*** (0.000)
Loan growth · Real estate boom	4.38*** (0.000)	4.21*** (0.000)	2.22*** (0.000)
Loan growth · Real estate bust	7.95*** (0.000)	7.86*** (0.000)	3.17** (0.015)
Loan growth · Stock market boom	3.26*** (0.000)	3.36*** (0.001)	0.69 (0.194)
Loan growth · Stock market bust	3.92*** (0.000)	4.28*** (0.000)	1.14* (0.082)
Leverage	0.01*** (0.005)	0.01*** (0.004)	0.00** (0.040)
Leverage · Real estate boom	0.01** (0.030)	0.01 (0.153)	0.01*** (0.000)
Leverage · Real estate bust	-0.01 (0.196)	-0.01 (0.180)	-0.01*** (0.004)
Leverage · Stock market boom	-0.01*** (0.001)	-0.01** (0.013)	-0.01*** (0.002)
Leverage · Stock market bust	-0.02*** (0.000)	-0.02*** (0.004)	-0.02*** (0.000)

(table continued on next page)

Table 4 - continued

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Maturity mismatch	-0.68*** (0.000)	-0.64*** (0.000)	-0.32*** (0.006)
Maturity mismatch · Real estate boom	0.27*** (0.006)	0.30*** (0.010)	0.18** (0.033)
Maturity mismatch · Real estate bust	0.45** (0.034)	0.56** (0.042)	-0.13 (0.436)
Maturity mismatch · Stock market boom	0.67*** (0.000)	0.59*** (0.000)	0.03 (0.743)
Maturity mismatch · Stock market bust	0.38*** (0.007)	0.54*** (0.009)	-0.02 (0.787)
GDP growth	-3.78*** (0.004)	-3.64 (0.130)	
log(Interest rate)	-0.05 (0.173)	-0.02 (0.676)	
Inflation	7.19** (0.031)	1.94 (0.366)	
Investment-to-GDP growth	-0.85** (0.012)	-0.51 (0.201)	
Credit-to-GDP growth	1.76** (0.017)	1.79* (0.056)	
Bank FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-time FE	No	No	Yes
No. of banks	1,264	1262	1,264
No. of obs.	165,149	55128	165192
Adj. R ²	0.827	0.849	0.891
Adj. R ² within	0.120	0.137	0.044

Table 5: The importance of bank-level developments

Dependent variable: systemic risk estimated by ΔCoVaR . “... boom” and “... bust” indicate the respective bubble phases estimated based on the BSADF approach. The coefficients report the effect of the bubble phases conditional on all bank-level variables being at the indicated percentile of their distribution. The coefficients on bank characteristics, the interactions between bank characteristics and bubble indicators, and the coefficients on macroeconomic control variables are identical to the ones reported in Table 4, column 1. Variable definitions are provided in Table C.1. Standard errors are clustered at the bank and country-time level. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. P-values are in parentheses.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Percentile of bank characteristics	50 th	75 th	85 th	95 th
Real estate boom	0.00 (0.977)	0.09 (0.285)	0.15* (0.100)	0.30*** (0.006)
Real estate bust	0.21 (0.106)	0.55*** (0.001)	0.72*** (0.000)	1.04*** (0.000)
Stock market boom	0.38*** (0.000)	0.48*** (0.000)	0.50*** (0.000)	0.52*** (0.000)
Stock market bust	0.37*** (0.000)	0.56*** (0.000)	0.62*** (0.000)	0.70*** (0.000)
Bank FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bank characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bank characteristics · Bubble indicators	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Macroeconomic control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
No. of banks	1,264	1,264	1,264	1,264
No. of obs.	165,149	165,149	165,149	165,149
Adj. R ²	0.827	0.827	0.827	0.827
Adj. R ² within	0.120	0.120	0.120	0.120

Table 6: Descriptive statistics on bubble characteristics during bubble episodes

The statistics are calculated conditional on the corresponding bubble indicator being equal to one. For example, within stock market boom periods, a stock market boom has on average been present for 29 months and features a 78% price increase relative to the pre-bubble level. For variable definitions, see Section 5.3 and Table C.1.

Variable	Mean	Median	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Length					
Stock market boom	29	28	17.8	1	64
Stock market bust	8	8	5.5	1	37
Real estate boom	69	68	40.1	1	318
Real estate bust	15	10	16.8	1	93
Size					
Stock market boom	0.78	0.72	0.54	0.00	8.42
Stock market bust	0.12	0.13	0.08	0.00	0.35
Real estate boom	0.38	0.33	0.29	0.00	1.71
Real estate bust	0.06	0.05	0.07	0.00	0.43

Table 7: The role of bubble characteristics

Dependent variable: systemic risk estimated by ΔCoVaR . “... boom” and “... bust” indicate the respective bubble phases estimated based on the BSADF approach. “Length” and “size” capture bubble characteristics. Estimation results for bank characteristics (bank size, loan growth, leverage, and maturity mismatch), interactions between bank characteristics and bubble indicators, and macroeconomic control variables (GDP growth, interest rate, inflation, investment-to-GDP growth, and credit-to-GDP growth) are reported in Table C.3. Variable definitions are provided in Table C.1. Standard errors are clustered at the bank and country-time level. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. P-values are in parentheses.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Stock market boom	0.335*** (0.000)	0.313*** (0.000)	0.340*** (0.000)
Stock market boom length		0.015*** (0.000)	
Stock market boom size			0.423*** (0.000)
Stock market bust	0.364*** (0.000)	0.337*** (0.000)	0.360*** (0.000)
Stock market bust length		-0.022*** (0.005)	
Stock market bust size			-1.077 (0.152)
Real estate boom	0.005 (0.935)	-0.067 (0.331)	-0.046 (0.497)
Real estate boom length		-0.002** (0.023)	
Real estate boom size			-0.123 (0.259)
Real estate bust	0.244* (0.055)	0.155 (0.253)	0.178 (0.198)
Real estate bust length		-0.009*** (0.008)	
Real estate bust size			-1.679** (0.032)
Bank FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
No. of banks	1,264	1,264	1,264
No. of obs.	165,149	165,149	165,149
Adj. R ²	0.827	0.831	0.829
Adj. R ² within	0.120	0.142	0.134

Table 8: Large and small banks

Estimates of the baseline regression (see Equation (1)) for small and large banks separately. To eliminate the US bias in our sample of small banks, we exclude the smallest US banks in columns 3 and 6 such that the number of US observations falls below the number of observations coming from the country contributing the second largest share of observations on small banks (France). See table C.2 for an overview of the number of banks and observations per country. Dependent variable in columns 1 to 3: systemic risk estimated by ΔCoVaR . Dependent variable in columns 4 to 6: $\log(\Delta\text{CoVaR})$. "... boom" and "... bust" indicate the respective bubble phases estimated based on the BSADF approach. Variable definitions are provided in Table C.1. Standard errors are clustered at the bank and country-time level. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. P-values are in parentheses.

Group of banks:	(1) large	(2) small	(3) small fewer US	(4) large	(5) small	(6) small fewer US
Dependent variable:	ΔCoVaR			$\log(\Delta\text{CoVaR})$		
Real estate boom	-0.07 (0.485)	0.00 (0.989)	0.03 (0.472)	0.00 (0.863)	0.01 (0.756)	0.02 (0.336)
Real estate bust	0.48*** (0.007)	0.19 (0.151)	0.18*** (0.008)	0.11*** (0.000)	0.13** (0.012)	0.10*** (0.000)
Stock market boom	0.42*** (0.000)	0.29*** (0.000)	0.14*** (0.003)	0.11*** (0.000)	0.16*** (0.000)	0.05*** (0.007)
Stock market bust	0.65*** (0.000)	0.30*** (0.000)	0.28*** (0.000)	0.18*** (0.000)	0.19*** (0.000)	0.14*** (0.000)
log(Bank size)	0.59*** (0.000)	0.16*** (0.000)	0.31*** (0.000)	0.14*** (0.000)	0.06*** (0.000)	0.12*** (0.000)
log(Bank size) · Real estate boom	-0.13** (0.018)	0.00 (0.931)	-0.03 (0.391)	-0.04*** (0.006)	0.02*** (0.001)	-0.01 (0.687)
log(Bank size) · Real estate bust	0.14 (0.153)	0.12*** (0.000)	0.09* (0.077)	0.01 (0.607)	0.02* (0.084)	-0.01 (0.571)
log(Bank size) · Stock market boom	0.07 (0.221)	0.04** (0.045)	0.08*** (0.005)	0.02 (0.137)	0.00 (0.523)	0.07*** (0.000)
log(Bank size) · Stock market bust	0.11** (0.011)	0.10*** (0.000)	0.11*** (0.001)	0.02* (0.057)	0.00 (0.651)	0.01 (0.363)
Loan growth	-7.51*** (0.000)	-3.49*** (0.000)	-1.66** (0.045)	-2.12*** (0.000)	-1.85*** (0.000)	-0.82** (0.017)
Loan growth · Real estate boom	3.83* (0.059)	3.89*** (0.000)	1.17 (0.180)	1.04** (0.037)	2.17*** (0.000)	0.99** (0.023)
Loan growth · Real estate bust	18.50*** (0.000)	5.21*** (0.000)	4.73* (0.054)	4.69*** (0.000)	1.82*** (0.006)	1.92** (0.017)
Loan growth · Stock market boom	4.91** (0.028)	2.77*** (0.000)	-0.05 (0.968)	1.34** (0.010)	1.38*** (0.000)	0.54 (0.342)
Loan growth · Stock market bust	7.37*** (0.005)	3.24*** (0.000)	0.09 (0.959)	1.67** (0.012)	1.13** (0.013)	0.62 (0.388)

(table continued on next page)

Table 8 - continued

Dependent variable:	Group of banks:		(3) small fewer US	(4) large	(5) small	(6) small fewer US
	(1) large	(2) small				
	ΔCoVaR		$\log(\Delta\text{CoVaR})$			
Leverage	0.02** (0.026)	0.00*** (0.004)	0.00 (0.767)	0.00** (0.048)	0.00*** (0.000)	0.00 (0.613)
Leverage · Real estate boom	0.01 (0.195)	-0.00 (0.681)	-0.00 (0.538)	0.00 (0.243)	-0.00** (0.014)	-0.00 (0.340)
Leverage · Real estate bust	-0.03* (0.079)	-0.01 (0.147)	0.01 (0.109)	-0.01* (0.057)	-0.00 (0.875)	0.01* (0.058)
Leverage · Stock market boom	-0.02*** (0.002)	-0.01** (0.013)	-0.01* (0.063)	-0.01*** (0.002)	-0.00* (0.058)	-0.00* (0.077)
Leverage · Stock market bust	-0.03*** (0.000)	-0.01** (0.019)	-0.01** (0.019)	-0.01*** (0.000)	0.00 (0.670)	0.00 (0.977)
Maturity mismatch	-0.98** (0.020)	-0.24** (0.044)	-0.42** (0.021)	-0.19* (0.057)	-0.14** (0.020)	-0.23*** (0.003)
Maturity mismatch · Real estate boom	0.48* (0.094)	0.17* (0.079)	0.38*** (0.007)	0.11 (0.127)	0.12*** (0.006)	0.17*** (0.006)
Maturity mismatch · Real estate bust	0.54 (0.423)	0.36* (0.062)	0.14 (0.508)	0.11 (0.412)	0.17** (0.028)	0.20** (0.041)
Maturity mismatch · Stock market boom	0.63* (0.079)	0.49*** (0.000)	0.25 (0.141)	0.15 (0.143)	0.21*** (0.000)	-0.08 (0.316)
Maturity mismatch · Stock market bust	0.62** (0.036)	0.21 (0.141)	-0.03 (0.862)	0.12* (0.097)	0.07 (0.228)	0.00 (0.966)
GDP growth	-0.75 (0.603)	-4.83*** (0.001)	-1.86*** (0.006)	-0.08 (0.790)	-2.39*** (0.000)	-0.95*** (0.000)
log(Interest rate)	-0.06 (0.417)	-0.04 (0.206)	0.03 (0.239)	-0.04** (0.034)	-0.04** (0.014)	-0.01 (0.317)
Inflation	13.06*** (0.001)	6.24* (0.076)	7.22*** (0.000)	2.30*** (0.000)	2.13* (0.099)	2.25*** (0.000)
Investment-to-GDP growth	-1.51*** (0.003)	-0.54 (0.107)	-0.18 (0.286)	-0.34*** (0.001)	-0.26* (0.068)	-0.12* (0.059)
Credit-to-GDP growth	2.57*** (0.003)	1.27 (0.106)	1.09** (0.020)	0.50*** (0.006)	0.42 (0.208)	0.50*** (0.006)
Bank FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
No. of banks	192	1,072	257	191	974	247
No. of obs.	28,916	136,233	31,400	28,844	126,378	30,502
Adj. R ²	0.574	0.835	0.811	0.761	0.930	0.914
Adj. R ² within	0.173	0.102	0.113	0.209	0.113	0.165

Table 9: Choice of sample period

The first column shows our baseline regression formulated in Equation (1) and already reported in Table 4, column 1. Columns 2 to 4 restrict the sample period as indicated. Dependent variable: systemic risk estimated by ΔCoVaR . “... boom” and “... bust” indicate the respective bubble phases estimated based on the BSADF approach. Variable definitions are provided in Table C.1. Standard errors are clustered at the bank and country-time level. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. P-values are in parentheses.

	(1) full sample	(2) t>1995m1	(3) without 2008	(4) t<2007m12
Real estate boom	0.00 (0.935)	-0.01 (0.900)	0.12*** (0.000)	0.25*** (0.000)
Real estate bust	0.24* (0.055)	0.24* (0.069)	0.41*** (0.000)	0.72*** (0.000)
Stock market boom	0.33*** (0.000)	0.31*** (0.000)	0.32*** (0.000)	0.30*** (0.000)
Stock market bust	0.36*** (0.000)	0.34*** (0.000)	0.44*** (0.000)	0.42*** (0.000)
log(Bank size)	0.27*** (0.000)	0.24*** (0.000)	0.18*** (0.000)	0.04 (0.259)
log(Bank size) · Real estate boom	0.00 (0.895)	-0.01 (0.632)	0.01 (0.270)	0.07*** (0.000)
log(Bank size) · Real estate bust	0.15*** (0.000)	0.15*** (0.000)	0.12*** (0.000)	0.27*** (0.000)
log(Bank size) · Stock market boom	0.05*** (0.007)	0.04* (0.057)	0.06*** (0.000)	0.10*** (0.000)
log(Bank size) · Stock market bust	0.11*** (0.000)	0.11*** (0.000)	0.12*** (0.000)	0.15*** (0.000)
Loan growth	-4.38*** (0.000)	-4.21*** (0.000)	-3.35*** (0.000)	-2.60*** (0.000)
Loan growth · Real estate boom	4.38*** (0.000)	4.46*** (0.000)	2.79*** (0.000)	1.98*** (0.005)
Loan growth · Real estate bust	7.95*** (0.000)	8.56*** (0.000)	7.63*** (0.000)	3.12* (0.093)
Loan growth · Stock market boom	3.26*** (0.000)	3.22*** (0.000)	2.77*** (0.000)	1.95*** (0.005)
Loan growth · Stock market bust	3.92*** (0.000)	3.84*** (0.000)	3.77*** (0.000)	2.41*** (0.004)
Leverage	0.01*** (0.005)	0.01** (0.012)	0.00*** (0.003)	0.02*** (0.000)
Leverage · Real estate boom	0.01** (0.030)	0.01*** (0.007)	0.01* (0.091)	-0.01*** (0.007)
Leverage · Real estate bust	-0.01 (0.196)	-0.00 (0.587)	-0.01 (0.186)	-0.05*** (0.000)
Leverage · Stock market boom	-0.01*** (0.001)	-0.01*** (0.003)	-0.01*** (0.001)	-0.02*** (0.000)
Leverage · Stock market bust	-0.02*** (0.000)	-0.02*** (0.000)	-0.02*** (0.000)	-0.02*** (0.000)

(table continued on next page)

Table 9 - *continued*

	(1) full sample	(2) t>1995m1	(3) without 2008	(4) t<2007m12
Maturity mismatch	-0.68*** (0.000)	-0.61*** (0.000)	-0.59*** (0.000)	-0.59*** (0.001)
Maturity mismatch · Real estate boom	0.27*** (0.006)	0.20** (0.042)	0.30*** (0.001)	0.55*** (0.000)
Maturity mismatch · Real estate bust	0.45** (0.034)	0.41* (0.065)	0.61*** (0.008)	0.84*** (0.000)
Maturity mismatch · Stock market boom	0.67*** (0.000)	0.66*** (0.000)	0.60*** (0.000)	0.55*** (0.000)
Maturity mismatch · Stock market bust	0.38*** (0.007)	0.38*** (0.006)	0.40*** (0.001)	0.32*** (0.006)
GDP growth	-3.78*** (0.004)	-4.44*** (0.002)	-0.94 (0.315)	4.59*** (0.000)
log(Interest rate)	-0.05 (0.173)	-0.03 (0.460)	-0.10*** (0.003)	-0.02 (0.809)
Inflation	7.19** (0.031)	8.79** (0.018)	0.12 (0.925)	-1.49 (0.366)
Investment-to-GDP growth	-0.85** (0.012)	-0.84** (0.021)	-0.66*** (0.003)	-1.40*** (0.000)
Credit-to-GDP growth	1.76** (0.017)	1.51** (0.044)	0.19 (0.667)	0.36 (0.504)
Bank FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
No. of banks	1,264	1,263	1,264	1,101
No. of obs.	165,149	157,910	156,468	102,066
Adj. R ²	0.827	0.829	0.880	0.884
Adj. R ² within	0.120	0.106	0.127	0.194


A Estimation of bubble episodes

The BSADF approach applies sequences of ADF tests to systematically changing fractions of a sample to identify episodes of explosive processes in price data. We follow the estimation strategy proposed by Phillips, Shi, and Yu (2015a). To fix notation, let r_1 denote some starting fraction of the sample and r_2 some ending fraction, implying $r_1 < r_2$. The fraction of the corresponding subsample is given by $r_w = r_2 - r_1$. Furthermore, let r_0 denote the fractional threshold which ensures that any analyzed subsample is large enough for the test to be efficient. The threshold is chosen according to $r_0 = 0.01 + 1.8\sqrt{T}$, where T refers to the number of observations in the sample.

The BSADF statistic (as opposed to the approach) for sample fraction r_2 is given by the supremum of all values of the test-statistics of ADF tests performed while holding the ending fraction of the sample fixed at r_2 and varying the starting fraction from 0 to $r_2 - r_0$. Figure A.1 illustrates the idea. Formally, the BSADF statistic is thus given by

$$BSADF_{r_2}(r_0) = \sup_{r_1 \in [0, r_2 - r_0]} \{BSADF_{r_1}^{r_2}\}. \quad (\text{A.1})$$

Figure A.1: Recursive nature of the BSADF test



Source: Phillips, Shi, and Yu (2015a, p. 1052)

The identification of bubble episodes relies on a sequence of BSADF statistics resulting from varying ending fraction r_2 . To fix the further notation, let the fraction of the sample at which the bubble starts be denoted by r_e , the fraction of the sample at which it ends by r_f and the estimators of both by \hat{r}_e and \hat{r}_f respectively. The starting fraction r_e is estimated by the earliest point in time for which the BSADF test rejects the null hypothesis of no bubble existing. Similarly, the

estimator for ending fraction r_f is given by the earliest point in time after the emergence of the bubble and some minimum bubble length $\delta \log(T)$ for which the BSADF test does not reject the null. Formally,

$$\hat{r}_e = \inf_{r_2 \in [r_0, 1]} [r_2 : BSADF_{r_2}(r_0) > scv_{r_2}^\beta] \quad (\text{A.2})$$

$$\text{and } \hat{r}_f = \inf_{r_2 \in [\hat{r}_e + \delta \log(T), 1]} [r_2 : BSADF_{r_2}(r_0) < scv_{r_2}^\beta], \quad (\text{A.3})$$

where T is the number of observations of the analyzed time series and $scv_{r_2}^\beta$ is the critical value of the BSADF statistic based on $[Tr_2]$ observations and confidence level β . $[Tr_2]$ refers to the largest integer smaller than or equal to Tr_2 . Critical values are obtained by Monte Carlo simulations based on 2,000 repetitions. The parameter δ is to be chosen freely according to one's beliefs about what minimum duration should be required in order to call surging prices a bubble. The minimum length requirement excludes short blips from being identified as bubbles and prevents estimating an overly early termination date of bubbles taking off slowly. We choose δ such that the minimum length of bubbles equals 6 months. The test identifies a few instances of bust-boom cycles which might be interpreted as "negative bubbles". Unfortunately, their number is too low to be included as separate category in the main analyses. As the dynamics during such bust-boom cycles are likely to be quite different from those during customary bubble episodes, we disregard these bust-boom episodes when constructing the bubble indicators.

B Estimation of ΔCoVaR

ΔCoVaR is based on the concept of value at risk (VaR). The VaR captures the maximum return loss x_i of institution i that will not be exceeded with probability q within a certain time. Following the notation in Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016), the VaR of institution i is implicitly defined by the following equation:

$$Pr(X^i \leq VaR_q^i) = q\% . \quad (\text{B.1})$$

CoVaR is the VaR of the system conditional on event $C(X^i)$ of institution i , which finds an implicit expression in

$$Pr(X^{system}|C(X^i) \leq CoVaR_q^{system|C(X^i)}) = q\% . \quad (B.2)$$

$\Delta CoVaR_q^{system|i}$ captures the difference between the financial system's value at risk conditional on institution i realizing losses at the q -th percentile of its loss-distribution and the system's value at risk conditional on institution i realizing losses at the 50-th percentile:

$$\Delta CoVaR_q^{system|i} = CoVaR_q^{system|X^i=VaR_q^i} - CoVaR_q^{system|X^i=VaR_{50}^i} . \quad (B.3)$$

A larger value of $\Delta CoVaR$ thus corresponds to a higher systemic risk contribution of institution i .

To estimate the measure, we obtain daily information on the number of outstanding shares, unpadded unadjusted prices of common equity in national currency, and the corresponding market capitalization in US Dollar from Thomson Reuters Datastream for all listed institutions in our sample. To exclude public offerings, repurchases of shares and similar activities biasing the results, observations for which the number of outstanding shares changed compared to the previous day are dropped. The daily observations are then collapsed to weekly frequency. From this data, we calculate the weekly return losses on equity (X) of institution i and those of the financial system:

$$X_{t+1}^i = -\frac{P_{t+1}^i N_{t+1}^i - P_t^i N_t^i}{P_t^i N_t^i} \text{ and} \quad (B.4)$$

$$X_{t+1}^{system} = \sum_i \frac{MV_t^i}{\sum_i MV_t^i} X_{t+1}^i , \quad (B.5)$$

where P_t^i is the price of common equity of institution i at time t in national currency, N refers to the number of outstanding shares and MV is the market value in US Dollar. We use national currencies to compute the return losses in Equation (B.4) to prevent exchange rate fluctuations biasing our results. To clarify the relevance of the currency, suppose return losses of Eurozone banks were calculated in US Dollar. Further suppose, the Euro would depreciate vis-à-vis the US Dollar. Then, all other things equal, all banks in the Eurozone would simultaneously experience

return losses which would lead to increases in ΔCoVaR . When calculating market shares of each institution (the ratio in Equation (B.5)) we have to rely on a uniform currency, which is why we use the market values in USD there. While exchange rate fluctuations introduce noise into the calculation of system return losses, they do not bias the results. Note that we calculate the system returns including the returns of institution i . One might suspect this to introduce a bias into the subsequent estimations as it should increase the correlation between system returns and institution-specific returns. Given the large number of institutions in our sample, such a bias should be negligible. We assess the robustness of the estimations by defining a separate system for each financial institution by excluding the corresponding institution from the calculation of the returns of its system. As in Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016), the results are highly robust to this alternative specification. The sample is restricted to institutions with at least 260 weeks of non-missing return losses to ensure convergence of the following estimations. The return losses are merged with variables capturing general risk factors. Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) use the following state variables:

- The change in the three-month yield calculated from the three-month T-Bill rate published with the Federal Reserve Board's H.15 release.
- The change in the slope of the yield curve as captured by the yield spread between the ten-year Treasury rate (FRB H.15) and the three-month T-Bill rate.
- The TED spread, measured as the difference between the three-month Libor rate (FRED database) and the three-month secondary market bill rate (FRB H.15).
- The change in the credit spread between the bonds obtaining a Baa rating from Moody's (FRB H.15) and the ten-year Treasury rate.
- The weekly market returns of the S&P 500.
- Equity volatility calculated as a 22-day rolling window standard deviation of the daily CRSP equity market return.

- The difference between the weekly real estate sector return (companies with a SIC code between 65 and 66) and the weekly financial system return (all financial companies in the sample).

As usual for the estimation of ΔCoVaR outside the US, we do not include the spread between the real estate sector return and the financial system return.¹¹ Since we estimate ΔCoVaR in a multi-country setting, we assign each financial institution to one of the following four financial systems: North America, Europe, Japan or Australia. The association with a system is based on the location of an institutions' headquarter. We use system-specific control variables. Table B.1 provides an overview of the data used to construct these control variables.

The return losses and control variables are used to estimate the VaR of institution i with the help of the following quantile regressions:¹²

$$\text{VaR}_{q,t}^i = \hat{X}_t^i = \hat{\alpha}_q^i + \hat{\gamma}_q^i M_{t-1} . \quad (\text{B.6})$$

M_{t-1} is a vector of control variables consisting of the general risk factors listed above. We apply a stress level of $q = 98\%$ in all regressions. Next, the relationship between institution-specific losses and system losses are estimated with the following quantile regressions:

$$\hat{X}_{q,t}^{system|i} = \hat{\alpha}_q^{system|i} + \hat{\gamma}_q^{system|i} M_{t-1} + \hat{\beta}_q^{system|i} X_t^i . \quad (\text{B.7})$$

The conditional value at risk is calculated by combining estimates from the two previous regressions, namely:

$$\text{CoVaR}_{q,t}^i = \hat{\alpha}_q^{system|i} + \hat{\gamma}_q^{system|i} M_{t-1} + \hat{\beta}_q^{system|i} \text{VaR}_{q,t}^i . \quad (\text{B.8})$$

¹¹López-Espinosa, Moreno, Rubia, and Valderrama (See, e. g., 2012); Barth and Schnabel (See, e. g., 2013).

¹²Quantile regressions allow the estimated coefficient to depend on a quantile of the distribution of the dependent variable. This is achieved by minimizing the weighted absolute difference between some quantile q of the dependent variable and its fit. Unlike OLS, this least absolute deviation (LAD) estimator does thus not assign equal weight to all observations. For a detailed exposition of quantile regressions see Koenker (2005). The literature suggests a number of alternative estimation techniques: MGARCH (Girardi and Tolga Ergün, 2013), copulas (Mainik and Schaanning, 2012; Oh and Patton, 2015), maximum likelihood (Cao, 2013), and Bayesian inference (Bernardi, Gayraud, and Petrella, 2013). Neither of these alternative approaches is more widely applied than the quantile regressions.

Following the definition provided in Equation (B.3), the time series of ΔCoVaR are calculated as

$$\Delta\text{CoVaR}_{q,t}^i = \hat{\beta}_q^{\text{system}|i} (\text{VaR}_{q,t}^i - \text{VaR}_{50,t}^i) . \quad (\text{B.9})$$

We collapse these estimates to monthly frequency by taking simple averages in order to merge them with all other variables included in our main analyses.

Table B.1: System-specific data

The 10-year government bond rates for Germany, Japan and Australia are only available at monthly frequency. In these instances, we use cubic spline interpolations to obtain the weekly observations required for the quantile regressions.

Adrian and Brunnermeier 2016	Data used instead			
	North America	Europe	Japan	Australia
10Y treasury rate	US 10Y treasury rate (FRED)	German 10Y govt. bond rate (OECD)	Japanese 10Y govt. bond rate (OECD)	Australian 10Y govt. bond rate (OECD)
3M T-Bill rate	US 3M T-Bill rate (FRED)	German 3M govt. bond rate (Bloomberg, FRED)	Japanese 3M govt. bond rate (Bloomberg, FRED)	Australian 3M govt. bond rate (Bloomberg, FRED)
3M Libor rate	3M Libor rate (FRED)	3M Fibor and 3M Euribor rate (Datastream)	3M Japanese Libor rate (FRED)	Australian 3M interbank rate (Datastream)
Moody's Baa rated bonds	Moody's Baa rated bonds (FRED)	Moody's Baa rated bonds (FRED)	Moody's Baa rated bonds (FRED)	Moody's Baa rated bonds (FRED)
S&P500	MSCI North America (Datastream)	MSCI Europe (Datastream)	MSCI Japan (Datastream)	MSCI Australia (Datastream)
CRSP equity market index	MSCI North America (Datastream)	MSCI Europe (Datastream)	MSCI Japan (Datastream)	MSCI Australia (Datastream)

C Additional tables

Table C.1: Variable definitions and data sources

Detailed information on the construction of variables is provided in Sections 3 and 5.3, as well as Appendices A and B.

Variable name	Description
Dependent variable	
ΔCoVaR	Change in the conditional value at risk; estimation strategy provided in Section 3.2 and Appendix B. Source of market equity data: Datastream. Sources of control variables: see Table B.1.
Bubble indicators	
Real estate boom	Country-specific binary indicator; equal one during the boom phase of a real estate bubble; estimated based on the BSADF approach (cf. Section 3.2 and Appendix B). Data source of real estate date: OECD.
Real estate bust	Country-specific binary indicator; equal one during the bust phase of a real estate bubble; estimated based on the BSADF approach (cf. Section 3.2 and Appendix B). Data source of real estate date: OECD.
Stock market boom	Country-specific binary indicator; equal one during the boom phase of a stock market bubble; estimated based on the BSADF approach (cf. Section 3.2 and Appendix B). Data source of stock market indeces: Datastream.
Stock market bust	Country-specific binary indicator; equal one during the bust phase of a stock market bubble; estimated based on the BSADF approach (cf. Section 3.2 and Appendix B). Data source of stock market indeces: Datastream.
Bubble characteristics	
Length	Four country-specific variables (real estate boom length, real estate bust length, stock market boom length, stock market bust length); number of months since the beginning or climax of the respective bubble phase and episode; equal zero outside the respective bubble phase and episode (cf. Section 5.3). Sources of the underlying data: OECD and Datastream.
Size	Four country-specific variables (real estate boom size, real estate bust size, stock market boom size, stock market bust size); size of an emerging bubble or size of its collapse; equal zero outside bubble episodes (cf. Section 5.3). Sources of the underlying data: OECD and Datastream.

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Table C.1 - *continued*

Variable name	Description
Bank characteristics	
Bank size	log(total assets); winsorized at 1%/99%. Source: Bankscope.
Loan growth	$\Delta\log(\text{total loans})$; monthly growth rate of total loans excluding inter-bank lending; winsorized at 1%/99%. Source: Bankscope.
Leverage	Total assets/equity; winsorized at 1%/99%. Source: Bankscope.
Maturity mismatch	(Total deposits, money market and short-term funding - loans and advances to banks - cash and due from banks)/total assets; winsorized at 1%/99%. Source: Bankscope.
Macroeconomic variables	
GDP growth	$\Delta\log(\text{real GDP})$; monthly growth rate. Source: OECD.
Interest rate	log(10-year government bond rate); Source: OECD. for a robustness check: log(policy rate); Sources: OECD, Datastream, National Central Banks.
Inflation	$\Delta\log(\text{CPI})$; monthly rate. Source: OECD.
Investment-to-GDP growth	$\Delta\log(\text{investment}/\text{GDP})$; monthly rate. Source: OECD.
Credit-go-GDP growth	$\Delta\log(\text{private non-financial credit}/\text{GDP})$; monthly rate. Source: BIS.

Table C.2: Sample coverage

The choice of countries is entirely determined by data availability. See Section 5.4.1 for robustness checks excluding the results being driven by a single country.

Country	Full sample			Large banks			Small banks		
	Banks	# Obs.	% Obs.	Banks	# Obs.	% Obs.	Banks	# Obs.	% Obs.
Australia	16	2,732	2	9	1,605	6	7	1,127	1
Belgium	5	597	0	3	514	2	2	83	0
Canada	14	1,976	1	9	1,662	6	5	314	0
Denmark	19	2,981	2	3	440	2	16	2,541	2
Finland	4	696	0	2	114	0	2	582	0
France	48	6,515	4	10	1,776	6	38	4,739	3
Germany	24	3,581	2	15	1,960	7	9	1,621	1
Italy	36	5,917	4	22	2,498	9	14	3,419	3
Japan	112	6,210	4	66	3,652	13	46	2,558	2
Netherlands	9	1,198	1	3	283	1	6	915	1
Norway	24	3,369	2	3	283	1	21	3,086	2
Portugal	7	969	1	3	341	1	4	628	0
Spain	14	2,724	2	10	1,588	6	4	1,136	1
Sweden	6	1,192	1	4	1,084	4	2	108	0
Switzerland	23	3,609	2	10	786	3	13	2,823	2
UK	20	3,633	2	12	2,233	8	8	1,400	1
US	883	117,250	71	59	7,493	26	824	109,757	80
Total	1,264	165,149	100	243	28,312	100	1,021	136,837	100

Table C.3: Bubble characteristics

Dependent variable: systemic risk estimated by ΔCoVaR . “... boom” and “... bust” indicate the respective bubble phases estimated based on the BSADF approach. “Length” and “size” capture bubble characteristics. Variable definitions are provided in Table C.1. Standard errors are clustered at the bank and country-time level. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. P-values are in parentheses.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Stock market boom	0.335*** (0.000)	0.313*** (0.000)	0.340*** (0.000)
Stock market boom length		0.015*** (0.000)	
Stock market boom size			0.423*** (0.000)
Stock market bust	0.364*** (0.000)	0.337*** (0.000)	0.360*** (0.000)
Stock market bust length		-0.022*** (0.005)	
Stock market bust size			-1.077 (0.152)
Real estate boom	0.005 (0.935)	-0.067 (0.331)	-0.046 (0.497)
Real estate boom length		-0.002** (0.023)	
Real estate boom size			-0.123 (0.259)
Real estate bust	0.244* (0.055)	0.155 (0.253)	0.178 (0.198)
Real estate bust length		-0.009*** (0.008)	
Real estate bust size			-1.679** (0.032)

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Table C.3 - *continued*

	(1)	(2)	(3)
log(Bank size)	0.266*** (0.000)	0.273*** (0.000)	0.267*** (0.000)
log(Bank size) · Real estate boom	0.002 (0.895)	-0.001 (0.951)	0.002 (0.890)
log(Bank size) · Real estate bust	0.154*** (0.000)	0.177*** (0.000)	0.166*** (0.000)
log(Bank size) · Stock market boom	0.047*** (0.007)	0.069*** (0.000)	0.064*** (0.001)
log(Bank size) · Stock market bust	0.113*** (0.000)	0.113*** (0.000)	0.112*** (0.000)
Loan growth	-4.384*** (0.000)	-3.224*** (0.000)	-3.526*** (0.000)
Loan growth · Real estate boom	4.384*** (0.000)	2.882*** (0.000)	3.298*** (0.000)
Loan growth · Real estate bust	7.952*** (0.000)	6.136*** (0.000)	6.594*** (0.000)
Loan growth · Stock market boom	3.256*** (0.000)	1.900*** (0.010)	2.222*** (0.004)
Loan growth · Stock market bust	3.923*** (0.000)	3.238*** (0.000)	3.380*** (0.000)
Leverage	0.006*** (0.005)	0.005** (0.012)	0.005** (0.013)
Leverage · Real estate boom	0.008** (0.030)	0.007* (0.054)	0.008** (0.033)
Leverage · Real estate bust	-0.009 (0.196)	-0.012 (0.108)	-0.010 (0.173)
Leverage · Stock market boom	-0.014*** (0.001)	-0.013*** (0.001)	-0.015*** (0.000)
Leverage · Stock market bust	-0.020*** (0.000)	-0.021*** (0.000)	-0.020*** (0.000)

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Table C.3 - continued

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Maturity mismatch	-0.682*** (0.000)	-0.710*** (0.000)	-0.680*** (0.000)
Maturity mismatch · Real estate boom	0.271*** (0.006)	0.224** (0.020)	0.169* (0.081)
Maturity mismatch · Real estate bust	0.447** (0.034)	0.385* (0.060)	0.443** (0.036)
Maturity mismatch · Stock market boom	0.669*** (0.000)	0.350*** (0.002)	0.472*** (0.000)
Maturity mismatch · Stock market bust	0.377*** (0.007)	0.277* (0.057)	0.390*** (0.005)
GDP growth	-3.784*** (0.004)	-4.989*** (0.000)	-5.046*** (0.000)
log(Interest rate)	-0.052 (0.173)	-0.059 (0.102)	-0.052 (0.144)
Inflation	7.190** (0.031)	8.537** (0.013)	8.439** (0.014)
Investment-to-GDP growth	-0.854** (0.012)	-0.623* (0.051)	-0.665** (0.034)
Credit-to-GDP growth	1.763** (0.017)	2.043** (0.013)	1.943** (0.014)
Bank FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
No. of banks	1,264	1,264	1,264
No. of obs.	165,149	165,149	165,149
Adj. R ²	0.827	0.831	0.829
Adj. R ² within	0.120	0.142	0.134